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ABSTRACT 
The Marine Corps has formed a vision of how to conduct future amphibious 
watfare through its development of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (O:MFTS), Ship-
to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), and Sea-based Logistics (SBL) concepts. These 
concepts have forces deploying directly from ship to objectives ashore with a reduction 
or elimination of logistics infrastructure ashore. Combat forces operating ashore will be 
sustained directly from a sea-base with support from ship-to-shore transporters. By sea 
basing logistics functions, there will be a much greater demand upon these transporters. 
This thesis models the sea-based sustainment of Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB) forces deployed from amphibious watfare ships. A scenario for analysis is 
developed with force packages of personnel and equipment located at certain locations 
ashore during different days of an operation. Sustainment requirements and available 
transporter capacity are then determined and compared for twenty-seven cases 
comprising different ship-to-shore distances, different levels of aircraft attrition due to 
enemy interdiction, and different footprints of mobile logistics forces deployed ashore. 
This comparison provides insight into the ability of SBL to sustain forces ashore 
conducting operations in accordance with O:MFTS and STOM concepts. 
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DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the planner. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps has formed a vision of how to conduct future amphibious 
warfare through its development of Operational Maneuver From J;he Sea (O:MFTS), 
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), and Sea-based Logistics (SBL) concepts. These 
concepts treat the sea as a maneuver space and have forces deploying directly from ship 
to objectives ashore. By sea-basing command and control, logistics, and some of the fire 
support functions, a reduction of the landing force's footprint ashore will be achieved 
along with its advantage of a reduction in logistical requirements and an increase in 
ground unit mobility. These concepts envision that the combat forces operating ashore 
will be sustained directly from a sea-base with support from ship-to-shore transporters. 
This transition to basing logistics functions upon the sea, however, translates into 
a greater demand upon these transporters. Air and/or surface transporters could deliver 
sustainment. However, surface delivery involves opening, re-opening, or maintaining a 
beachhead and interior lines of communication to the forces operating ashore and starts to 
move away from the pure concepts of O:MFTS and STOM. The transporters desired to 
support the majority of logistics demand will be the aircraft organic to amphibious 
warfare ships. If aircraft cannot provide the necessary lift to deliver all required 
sustainment, the preference to employ LCAC sorties delivering sustainment would be to 
have these deliveries take place during the later periods of the operation, with the fewest 
number of sorties possible, and to support forces in areas that are the closest to the LCAC 
landing sites. 
The capability of transporters to deliver sustainment to forces operating ashore 
will be affected largely by ship-to-shore distances, transporter attrition due to enemy 
interdiction, and the footprint of supplies initially deployed ashore. Planners and decision 
makers require a means to gauge potential limitations for sea-base sustainment by 
observing the effects these 3 factors have upon the transporters capability to deliver 
sustainment to the forces ashore. 
This thesis models the sea-based sustainment of Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB) forces deployed from amphibious warfare ships. A scenario for analysis is 
developed with force packages of personnel and equipment located at different locations 
xiii 
ashore during certain days of an operation. Sustainment requirements are determined 
using both Marine Corps logistics planning factors (LPFs) and assumptions~ The 
expected availability and capability of transportation assets are determined through 
assumptions regarding maintenance readiness, dedication to missions other than 
sustainment, and performance characteristics. Three different levels of ship-to-shore 
distances (long, medium, short), aircraft attrition due to enemy interdiction (high, 
medium, none), and footprints of mobile logistics forces deployed ashore (heavy, light, 
none) are determined to provide a wide variation of case studies. This analysis then 
models the number of CH-53, MV-22, and LCAC sorties per day required to deliver 
sustainment ashore for each day of the operation. The model's objective function both 
minimizes the number of LCAC sorties required and, in the event that LCAC sorties are 
required, attempts to use these sorties to deliver sustainment to areas that have the 
shortest distance to the LCAC landing site. Observing information that entails the total 
number of LCAC sorties required for the entire operation, the day on which LCAC 
sorties are first required, and areas ashore that require support from LCACs helps 
compare the case studies to one another. Comparing these case studies provides insight 
into the capability of ship-to-shore transporters to support the SBL concept. These 
comparisons include some excursions that tests the transporters capability by further 
increasing the levels of attrition due to enemy interdiction. Overall, the analysis 
demonstrates potential limitations for sea-based sustainment. 
This analysis reveals that delivering sustainment with aircraft alone can be 
accomplished for all case studies where ship-to-shore distances are either short or 
medium as defined herein. Delivery of sustainment for all case studies that include long 
ship-to-shore distances can only be accomplished with support from LCAC sorties. In 
these case studies, however, the total number of LCAC sorties required to support the 
entire operation are reduced considerably by deploying a mobile logistics force as 
opposed to not deploying one, when aircraft attrition is relatively low. The day on which 
LCAC sorties are first required is also pushed back much further into the operation when 
deciding to deploy a mobile logistics force ashore. Because a larger size force will 
consume a greater quantity of supplies, deploying a heavy footprint of mobile logistics 
xiv 
forces does not reduce the total number of LCAC sorties by much, when compared to a 
light footprint. The heavy footprint, however, will delay the day on which LCAC sorties 
are first required by a day or more. 
Comparing results from these case studies can help planners and decision makers 
become more aware of the effects that factors they have control over, such as deploying 
logistics forces ashore and maintaining certain ship-to-shore distances, and factors they 
have less control over, such as the enemy's capability to attrite friendly aircraft, have 
upon the capability to deliver sustainment in accordance with SBL. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Concepts Division of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(MCCDC), through its development of the United States Marine Corps Warfighting 
Concepts for the 2rt Century [Ref. 1], has formed a vision of how the Marines Corps will 
fight in future campaigns. The cornerstones of these concepts are Operational Maneuver 
from the Sea (OMFTS), Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) and Sea-based Logistics 
(SBL). 
OMFTS describes how the United States Marine Corps and United States Navy 
will conduct future power projection operations. The main advantage that OMFTS 
provides is its generation of overwhelming tempo and momentum against the enemy by 
focusing on operational objectives while using the sea as a maneuver space [Ref. 2]. A 
key concept in OMFTS is reducing the footprint of the landing force by sea-basing 
command and control, logistics, and some of the fire support functions. With a reduction 
of the landing force's footprint also comes the advantage of both a reduction in logistical 
requirements and an increase in ground unit mobility. 
STOM is the concept for implementing OMFTS at the tactical level. STOM seeks 
to exploit advances in mobility, communications, navigational systems, and precision 
munitions by providing the commander the capability to maneuver combat forces 
seamlessly from over the horizon at sea to operational objective areas ashore [Ref. 3]. 
Deployment of forces will take place through vertical and/or surface means. However, 
landing forces will no longer have the requirement of securing the beach, which has an 
associated operational pause. Instead, the landing force will generate overwhelming 
tempo and over match enemy weakness with its power, surprise, and swift execution [Ref. 
3]. "By requiring the enemy to defend a vast area against our sea-borne mobility and deep 
power projection, naval forces will render most of his force irrelevant." [Ref. 3] 
The SBL concept describes the operational and tactical logistical support of forces 
operating ashore in accordance with both the OMFTS and STOM concepts. The primary 
focus of SBL is the sea basing of logistics functions to reduce or eliminate the logistics 
footprint ashore historically used in amphibious operations. By locating most if not all 
logistics functions on the sea, the combat service support (CSS) forces have the advantage 
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of concentrating more on supporting the warfighter without dedication of resources to 
support rear area security, a concern inherent in traditional shore-based logistics 
operations. Instead of vast quantities of material (much of which may be of little use) 
being pushed forward, tactical units will communicate consumption data that will pull 
tailored support to maneuver units [Ref. 4]. Requirements for SBL include total asset 
visibility, selective off-load capability, an effective command and control system, and the 
systems for delivering CSS from the ship to the force(s) ashore. 
This transition to basing logistics functions upon the sea, however, translates into a 
greater demand upon ship-to-shore transporters. Sustainment could be delivered ashore 
by air and/or surface transporters. Surface delivery involves opening/reopening/or 
maintaining a beachhead and interior lines of communication to the forces operating 
ashore [Ref. 5]. Further, tactical decisions to deliver sustainment via surface means will 
start to move away from the pure concepts of O:rvt:FTS and STOM. The transporters that 
will supply the majority of logistics demands will be the aircraft organic to amphibious 
warfare ships (amphibs) of the sea-base. Daily deliveries of water, rations, fuel and 
ammunition to the forces ashore will makeup the majority of logistics support missions for 
these aircraft. 
The ability of aircraft to deliver sustainment is constrained by aircraft readiness for 
sustainment missions, payload capacities, and maximum number of daily sorties, among 
other things. Aircraft readiness for sustainment missions is a function of maintenance 
readiness, combat attrition, and aircraft dedication to other missions. Aircraft payloads 
depend on aircraft type, commodity being transported, the distance to the forces ashore 
from the sea-base, mode of carry (internal or external), and environmental conditions. The 
maximum number of daily sustainment sorties per aircraft depends on maximum crew 
operational hours, aircraft speeds, and the distance from the sea-base to the forces ashore. 
In operations involving O:rvt:FTS and STOM scenarios, moving the sea-base further 
over the horizon and away from the shoreline may be required for protection of amphibs 
from enemy anti-ship missiles. Tactical decisions to move the sea-base further away from 
the shore will lengthen distances to the forces operating ashore and result in decreasing 
both aircraft payload and maximum number of daily sorties. Therefore, an increase in 
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enemy threat to amphibs corresponds to a decrease in the ability to deliver sustainment via 
aircraft. 
Tactical decisions to deploy logistics vehicles carrying sizable quantities of 
commodities ashore with the landing force would decrease the amount of sustainment 
required for delivery by aircraft sorties. These decisions, however, would increase the 
footprint of forces ashore, possibly slow down momentum, and require some resources 
dedicated to security of logistics vehicles. 
Planners and decision makers require a means to gauge potential limitations for 
sea-based sustainment by observing the effects of previously mentioned tactical decisions. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide insight to military planners of what effects 
tactical/operational decisions have on the Amphibious Task Force's (ATF) ability to 
sustain forces ashore from a sea-base. This thesis will model sea-based sustainment 
within a scenario involving elements of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) operating 
ashore. The scenario used for this analysis was provided for by the Studies and Analysis 
Division (S&A) of MCCDC [Ref. 6]. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. RECENT STUDIES 
Recent studies from officers in the Operational Logistics curriculum at the Naval 
Postgraduate School have focused on the limitations of SBL resulting from transportation 
support. In 1997, LT Mark Beddose focused his studies on Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) forces, while computing the maximum 
feasible ship-to-objective distances for operating aircraft sustainment missions [Ref. 7]. 
He stated that amphibs would desire to be located at least 100 nm from enemy shores due 
to the threat of anti-ship missiles, mines, diesel submarines, and small coastal craft. His 
model allowed for attrition of aircraft over time and as such showed how ship-to-objective 
distances would shrink, the longer sustainment missions continued. LT Beddose's 
analysis showed that anticipated future aircraft can support small infiltration type units but 
cannot support a traditional ground force mix at the ship-to-shore distances envisioned. 
In 1998, Major Robert Hagan examined the feasibility of sustaining elements of a 
:MEU(SOC) from a sea-base over a range of standard MEU(SOC) missions [Ref. 8]. He 
determined the people and equipment, together a force package, required for each mission. 
He then determined, using standard planning factors, each force package's sustainment 
requirements. By translating a force package's sustainment calculations into a demand for 
aircraft sorties, he demonstrated the degree to which a MEU(SOC)'s limited aircraft 
inventory will be able to meet requirements if sustainment is delivered exclusively via 
aerial means. 
In comparison to previous studies, this analysis uses similar discrete modeling to 
develop sustainment requirements for the forces ashore. Other similarities include 
observing the effects of aircraft attrition and the movement of ship-to-objective distances 
upon the capability to deliver sustainment with aircraft. This study differs, however, with 
the focus on supporting a much larger size force ashore, having a requirement to sustain 
tactical aircraft ashore, having a requirement to deliver sustainment to forces located in 
more than one location, and by observing the effects of deploying logistics vehicles upon 
the ability to sustain forces ashore. 
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B. SHIP TO SHORE TRANSPORTERS 
The transporters that will support ship to shore movement in future ATF 
campaigns are a combination of rotary-wing aircraft and surface craft. 
1. MV-22 
The MV-22 Osprey is the Marine Corps replacement for the CH-46E and CH-53D 
medium lift assault helicopters. The MV-22 is the Marine Corps version of a tilt-rotor 
aircraft, which can take-off and land vertically like a helicopter, then fly like an airplane. 
Using tilt rotor technology, this aircraft will be able to travel further, at much higher 
speeds and with a much larger payload than the fleet of aircraft that it is replacing. The 
MV -22 has not been introduced to the fleet yet, but is envisioned to be fully operational by 
2010. The following are tasks that the MV-22 will be able to perform: 
• Positioning/repositioning tactical forces from ship to shore 
• Support the distribution of supplies 
• Provide a command and control platform 
• Casualty evacuation 
• Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) 
The MV -22 will provide an enhanced capability of personnel deployment with its 
200+ knots speed. With regard to movement of external loads, the MV-22 will not 
provide a great speed advantage since its speed, in this case, will be constrained by the 
load's profile. MV-22 deliveries of cargo will be accomplished via external means due to 
internal constraints of cabin dimensions and cargo floor weight limitations. 
2. CH-53E 
The CH-53E Super Stallion is the Marine Corps heavy transport helicopter. Tasks 
for the CH-53E include those listed for the Osprey, however, the CH-53E is mostly 
utilized for its ability to externally lift heavy oversized equipment. The CH-53E is also 
used tactically for its capability to position/reposition artillery units in support of reducing 
5 
the effects of enemy counter-battery fires. It can move more personnel and possesses a 
greater payload capacity than the Osprey but cannot match the Osprey's speed when the 
MV-22 has an internal load. 
The CH-53 provides an enhanced capability to transport fuel when using the 
internally loaded Tactical Bulk Fuel Distribution System (TBFDS). The TBFDS is a three 
tank, air transportable, fuel-delivery, forward area refueling, and range-extension system. 
It consists of four subsystems: three 800-gallon fuel tanks, a restraint system, an electrical 
fuel control panel, and a two point dispensing system. The dispensing system is capable 
of pumping 120 gallons per minute and a 200-foot separation between the host aircraft and 
the receiving aircraft or vehicle [Ref. 9]. The TBFDS allows CH-53s to transport and 
dispense fuel to aircraft or vehicles at Forward Arming and Refueling Points (F ARP) 
ashore. The CH-53E with TBFDS supports the over-the-horizon refueling requirement 
contained in the OMFTS concept. 
3. Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) 
The LCAC employs air cushion vehicle technology with gas turbine propulsion 
making it a high speed, over-the-beach landing craft that can deliver a 60-75 ton payload 
from ships well over the horizon (e.g. > 25 nautical miles (nm)). It is used now to 
transport personnel, weapon systems, vehicles, and cargo from ship-to-shore across the 
beach. The LCAC will be the preferred landing craft for surface transportation of 
sustainment in an O:MFTS scenario. 
4. Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) 
The AAAV is the replacement for the AAV. It is not currently in the fleet but is 
envisioned to be at its full operating capability by 2012. The AAAV is a light armor 
protected personnel carrier that transports the surface assault elements from amphibs to 
objectives ashore. Once ashore, the AAA V supports mechanized operations through 
improved infantry mobility and direct fire support that will destroy antitank weapons, 
bunkers or dismounted infantry, etc. It will posses capabilities that will more than double 
the AA V speeds on both water and on land. The AAA V' s increased range over the AA V 
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enables it to have an over the horizon capability, one of the characteristics inherent in the 
OMFTS concept. 
The AAA V is not a transporter of sustainment, however. While the AAA V is a 
highly capable platform, the internal "cube" of the vehicle prohibits it from carrying large 
amounts of sustainment to forces ashore and with its impressive firepower it will be 
classified as an operational tool that the landing force commander will not likely commit 
to logistics duties [Ref. 10]. 
C. DAILY SUSTAINMENT REQUIRE:MENTS 
The daily sustainment requirements of the ground forces ashore are functions of 
the deployed number of personnel, number and types of equipment, number and types of 
weapon systems, and the events taking place ashore. Sustainment requirements are 
determined by respective classes of supply [Ref. 8]. The classes of supply are: 
• I Subsistence (MREs and Water) 
• n Individual Equipment 
• m Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants 
• IV Construction Materials 
• v ' Ammunition (W-Ground, A-Aviation) 
• VI Personal Demand Items 
• VII Major End Items 
• vm Medical Supplies 
• IX Repair Parts 
• X Non-Military Program Material 
Of the classes of supply, this thesis concentrates on the sustainment requirements 
of Class I, Class ill, and Class V. The material comprising Class I, Class ill, and Class V 
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are the largest, by weight and volume, and most challenging to move with air and surface 
transportation assets [Ref. 11]. 
This analysis uses Marine Corps Logistics Planning Factors (LPFs) published in 
the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Data Library (MDL) [Ref. 12] to model 
Class I, Class III, and Class V (W) requirements for the ground forces operating ashore. 
This analysis further categorizes requirements into commodities of rations (MREs), water, 
fuel, and ammunition. For rations and ammo, the weight that must be carried is calculated 
and for water and fuel the number of gallons that must be carried is calculated. Rations 
and ammunition movement via aircraft is accomplished externally in nets carrying pallets, 
while fuel and water movement is accomplished externally in bladders. Rations and 
ammunition movement via landing craft is accomplished by loading logistics vehicles 
with pallets of commodities, while fuel and water movement is accomplished by loading 
logistics vehicles carrying bulk liquid containers. 
Daily sustainment requirements of the Marine Corps tactical aircraft operating 
ashore are functions of number and types of tactical aircraft, number of sorties per aircraft, 
and ordnance payload of each aircraft. Tactical aircraft will require ammunition, fuel, and 
water sustainment support. There are no useful LPFs for tactical aircraft and therefore the 
determination of these aircrafts' sustainment requirements is accomplished through many 
assumptions. The scenario establishes the number and types of tactical aircraft employed. 
In accordance with the scenario, missions are assigned to the respectiye aircraft as well as 
an average number of daily sorties. Through the assignment of aircraft missions and 
discussions with personnel knowledgeable of these aircraft, ordnance payloads and LPFs 
detailing percentage of ordnance per sortie-mission, average fuel use per aircraft sortie, 
and average water use per aircraft sortie are developed [Refs. 13 and 14]. Tactical aircraft 
are re-supplied at the Forward Arming and Refueling Point (F ARP) when operating 
ashore. Ammunition and water are transported ashore to the F ARP by the same means as 




The first step in the approach is to obtain and develop a scenario that contains 
forces fighting ashore and consuming commodities, a sea-base of amphibs, a make up of 
ship-to-shore transporters, distances from the sea-base to forces ashore and a duration of 
the operation. This thesis uses a scenario drawn largely from one developed at the Studies 
and Analysis Division (S&A) of MCCDC [Ref. 6]. The scenario contains data and 
background information pertaining to elements of a MEB conducting an amphibious 
assault. 
The second step is to determine the factors to make variable within the study. This 
supports the development of different case studies for comparison and contrast. The 
factors that are varied in this study are based upon the enemy's capability to interdict both 
ships and transporters, the courses of action dealing with the use of logistics vehicles to 




A vital sea-line of communication has been mined by an enemy nation in the year 
2011(refer to figure 1). This enemy nation has anti-ship missile and theater ballistic 
missile (TBM) capabilities. The mission of this scenario is to deny the enemy the ability 
to launch their TBMs and anti-ship missiles from within a certain coastal area (90 nm by 
15 nm). This area must be controlled in support of naval forces accomplishing their 
mission of clearing mines and reopening the sea-lane (a strait). This requires locating and 
destroying fixed missile sites and mobile launchers operating in the area of responsibility 
along the coast. This mission is to be carried out by an Amphibious Task Force (A TF) 
comprised of a forward-deployed MEU and an Amphibious MEB deploying with east 
coast naval forces. The ATF mission is expected to last (14) days upon commencement of 
D-day. The meteorological condition in theater has the temperature at 105°F and 
humidity at 83%. The total number of personnel operating ashore is over 4,250 and the 
elevations inland are 500 feet above sea level. [Ref. 6] 
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Figure 1. Theater of Operations 
2. Scheme of Maneuver 
Amphibs maneuver within 25 nm of the area of responsibility (AOR). Naval ships 
operate under an AEGIS umbrella and are supplemented by an improved-self defense 
capability. One Battalion Landing Team (BLT) (3 infantry companies and an artillery 
battery) is inserted vertically into area of operation 1 (refer to Figure 2 for area of 
operation). The northern BLT seizes missile-firing facilities and establishes a blocking 
position to prevent enemy forces from entering the AOR. Two BLTs conduct surface 
landings in the south of the AOR (25 nm from the sea-base and located to the west of area 
of operation 8). Once ashore one BLT (with artillery battery and combat engineer 
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platoon) moves by AAA V to initial blocking positions in the south, oriented east (area of 
operation 8). The other mechanized BLT(-), reinforced with a tank company, will 
maneuver northwest to destroy any enemy missile sites in the A OR. It will conduct a link-
up with the northern BLT to reinforce the northern blocking position (also to deliver the 
prime movers to the howitzers that were inserted vertically). Two Light Armor 
Reconnaissance (LAR) companies (landing with the BLTs) will maneuver separately 
through the AOR (from the south to the north) to seek out and destroy enemy mobile 
TBMs and anti-ship missiles for a period of 4 days. Upon completion of the seek and 
destroy mission, the LAR companies will conduct a link up with the northern positioned 
BLTs. 
A Mobile (20 vehicles) Forward Arming and Refueling Point (Mobile F ARP) unit 
will phase ashore with the last surface landings. Once ashore, the Mobile F ARP moves 
north to a location beyond threat artillery range and in an area that can be easily secured. 
The Mobile F ARP is established ashore to support the AH-lZs and A V -8Bs with fuel, 
ammunition and water. The Mobile F ARP will help these aircraft to operate with minimal 
turn around time and help open ship flight deck space for logistics support flights. 
Figure 2. Areas of Operation Ashore (from Ref. 6) 
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3. Shipsffransporters 
Table 1 lists the specific ships that make up the sea-base and also details the 
transporter types and respective quantities that are maintained on each ship. The 
information regarding transporters maintained per ship is taken from the scenario [Ref. 6]. 
SHIP LCAC LCU MV-22 CH-53 
LHA-5 1 2 12 6 
LHD-1 2 0 12 6 
LHD-3 2 0 12 6 
LHD-5 (.MEU) 2 0 12 4 
LPD-17 2 0 0 0 
LPD-20 2 0 0 0 
LPD-24 2 0 0 0 
LPD-25 (.MEU) 2 0 0 0 
LSD-44 2 0 0 0 
LSD-45 3 0 0 0 
LSD-46 2 0 0 0 
LSD-50 (.MEU) 2 0 0 0 
Total: 24 2 48 22 
Table 1. Sea-base Ship and Transporter Make up 
4. Tactical Aircraft 
24 A V -8B Harriers self deploy from CONUS with strategic lift support from the 
Air Mobility Command (A.1\1C) and are shore-based in a nearby host nation. This 
provides additional space aboard the amphibious ships, a requirement to operate such a 
large number of transporters. 16 AH-lZ Cobras and 12 tJH-lN Hueys are also operating 
in theater from the amphibious ships. 
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B. ENEMY CAPABILITY AND OPERATIONAL DECISIONS 
With a scenario and forces ashore given, the objective is to evaluate the feasibility 
of sustaining operations ashore via SBL. The enemy's capabilities and operational/tactical 
decisions made by the A TF' s leadership have a major impact on the ability of the Marines 
fighting ashore to receive sufficient sustainment from a sea-base. As such, the following 
topics need to be addressed by planners and decision makers. 
1. Level of Enemy Threat to Amp bibs 
The first question that senior leadership needs to assess is, "What is the level of 
enemy threat to the amphibs?" Determining whether the threat is high, medium or low 
should translate into a safe operating distance from the sea-base to the operating forces 
ashore. An increased enemy threat to the amphibs requires an increase to the standoff 
distance from the sea-base to the shoreline. For an O:MFTS scenario, the minimum 
distance from ship to shore is over-the-horizon (approximately 25 nm). In this scenario 
three different sea-base locations are used to reflect a low, medium and high threat level to 
amphibious ships (refer to figure 3). A low threat to amphibs is analyzed using sea-base # 
1, a medium threat is analyzed using sea-base# 2, and a high threat is analyzed using sea-
base # 3. All activity on the first day of the operation (e.g. the sUiface deployment) will 
take place from the sea-base #I location. 
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Figure 3. Sea-base Locations 
2. Level of Enemy Threat to Friendly Aircraft 
The second question that needs to be assessed is, ''What is the enemy threat to our 
aircraft during the operation?" For this study. a high level of threat translates to a high 
level of aircraft attrition, a medium level threat translates to a medium level of aircraft 
attrition, and a minimal threat translates to no aircraft attrition. Having this information 
figures significantly into aircraft availability for support missions. 
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3. Addition of Logistics Vehicles to the Landing Plan 
The third question that requires determination is, "Can the concept of operations 
ashore support the addition of logistics vehicles to the landing plan?'' Introducing 
logistics vehicles ashore in the landing plan increases the footprint ashore and as such 
requires security, increases logistical requirements, and could possibly slow down the pace 
of operations. On the other hand, not only can these vehicles support forces with 
commodities initially carried but also can help in overall receipt and distribution of future 
commodities delivered by aircraft. They also possess a means to store inventory when 
commodity delivered by aircraft exceeds what is required for use on a certain day. This 
study examines the following situations with regard to the addition of logistics vehicles 
into the landing plan: 
• A light footprint of logistics vehicles in support of forces located in the 
northern area. These vehicles will travel north with tactical vehicles on day 
one. 
• A heavy footprint of logistics vehicles in support of forces located in the 
northern area. 
4. Use of Landing Craft for Sustainment Missions 
The last set of questions that require assessment are, "Will landing craft be 
vulnerable to enemy interdiction if used during the entire operation? Will the concept of 
operations ashore and enemy situation allow ground forces the capability to secure a 
beachhead and, from the beach, lines of communications ashore?" Yes or no answers to 
these questions translates into whether the A TF can or cannot employ landing craft for 
daily re-supply missions. In this scenario, the use of landing craft in support of sustaining 
forces ashore occur only in the event that aircraft cannot provide all the lift that is required 
for movement of sustainment. Due to the mine threat, the only beaches that can 
accommodate the landing craft are in the south of the A OR. If landing craft deliveries of 
sustainment are required, then there is a desire to have these deliveries be in support of the 
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southernmost forces, in an attempt to shorten the lines of communication from the beach 
to the area supported. 
C. CASE STUDIES 
This thesis models a certain number of case studies, providing information to 
planners and leadership to compare and contrast. The model's objective function is to 
minimize the number of LCAC sorties required to transport commodities ashore over the 
14-day operation. The ATF's desire in an OMFfS scenario is that aircraft, if feasible, 
accomplish all ship-to-shore movement of sustainment. This study uses three variables 
(threat to aircraft, ship-to-objective distances, and deployment of logistics vehicles) to 
develop 27 different case studies. The following three "example" tables provide a format 
for which all case studies can be presented and compared to one another by observing the 
number of LCAC sorties required to deliver sustainment. 
Enemy Threat Far Ship to Shore Medium Ship to Near Ship to Shore 
to Aircraft Distance Shore Distance Distance 
High 25 LCAC sorties 20 LCAC sorties 10 LCAC sorties 
Medium 15 LCAC sorties 10 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
None 12 LCAC sorties 6 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Table 2. No Deployment of Logistics Vehicles 
Enemy Far Ship to Shore Medium Ship to Near Ship to Shore 
Threat to Distance Shore Distance Distance 
Aircraft 
High 20 LCAC sorties 15 LCAC sorties 5 LCAC sorties 
Medium 10 LCAC sorties 5 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
None 7 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Table 3. Light footprint of Logistics Vehicles supporting the Northern Forces 
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Enemy Far Ship to Shore Medium Ship to Near Ship to Shore 
Threat to Distance Shore Distance Distance 
Aircraft 
High 5 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Medium 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
None 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Table 4. Heavy footprint of Logistics Vehicles supporting the Northern Forces 
Using the output obtained from these example tables, suppose the ATF felt that 
there was a medium enemy threat to its ships and thus operated at a medium ship-to-shore 
distance. Also supposed that there was no real enemy threat to friendly aircraft. Then the 
ATF leadership could anticipate the difference between deploying a light footprint of 
logistics vehicles ashore and not deploying these vehicles to be a requirement to deliver 
sustainment with 6 LCAC sorties over the 14-day operation. In this case, while keeping 
two variables fixed (ship-to-shore ~stances and enemy threat to aircraft), leadership can 
make a more informed decision regarding what value a third variable (deployment of 
logistics vehicles) should take on, by observing the effects their decisions have on the 
requirement to use LCACs to deliver sustainment ashore. 
The purpose of developing these tables is to provide a means to help the A TF 
Navy and Marine Corps leadership with their decision making process and in their 
management of risk. Through a comparison and contrast of the 27 different case studies 
presented, insight should be gained with regard to what the effects of operational decisions 
and the enemy's capability have upon the employment of SBL in an OMFTS scenario. 
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IV. :METHODOLOGY 
Daily sustainment requirements, transporter capabilities, the logistics vehicles 
deployed, and aircraft availability must be determined prior to employing the model. 
The following are the major factors for which assumptions have been made and data have 
been developed: 
A. DAILY SUSTAINMENT REQUIRE:MENTS 
1. Ground Forces 
a) Force Structure 
In calculating the ground force sustainment requirements, the size of the 
force and their equipment located in each area of operation, for each day of the scenario 
must first be determined. This data is taken from a scenario provided by the Studies and 
Analysis Division (S&A) of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(MCCDC) [Ref. 6]. These forces are characterized by number of personnel (consumers of 
both water and rations), vehicle types and respective quantities (consumers of bulk fuel) 
and weapon system types and respective quantities (consumers of ammunitions). Table 5 
provides a general picture of the size and make up of the ground forces ashore. 
Area of People HMMWV 7-Ton Logistics Light Advanced Tanks& Light Combat 
Operation Variants Trucks Vehicles Armored Assault Armored Weight Breacher 
and Vehicles Amphib Support 155 Vehicles 
Refuelers Vehicles Vehicles Howitzers 
1 2,271 119 31 0 0 35 18 12 2 
4 232 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 0 
7 55 10 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1,727 132 31 0 4 62 0 6 2 
Table 5. Case Study with no Logistics Vehicle Support of the Northern Area, on Day 3 
b) Determination of Daily Resupply Requirements 
Class I (food and water) requirements are a function of the number of 
pe~ple located ashore. Daily MRE requirements are computed and converted to a pounds 




Where M=total daily :MRE requirements in pounds 
N=number of people ashore 
D=daily MRE requirement per person,(3) 
P=average weight in pounds of one :MRE including packaging 
Daily water requirements are determined using the following equation 
H=N*W 
Where H=daily water requirements in gallons 
N=number of people ashore 
W=daily water planning factor in gallons 
The value for W provided in [Ref. 8] is 10 gal/day, however, the value for 
Win [Ref. 15] is 6 gal/day. In this analysis, the average of these two different values, 8 
gal/day, is used exclusively. 
Ground Combat Element (GCE) class ill (fuel) requirements are a function 
of equipment type and respective quantity. For each item of equipment, a daily 
requirement is computed based on planning factors for gallons per hour and operating 
hours per day [Ref. 8]. Fuel requirements are computed using the following equation 
[Ref. 8]: 
F = L X j * yj * E j 
j 
Where F=total daily fuel requirements in gallons 
Xj=average fuel use in gallons/hour for equipment type j, [Ref.12] 
Yj=average operational hours/day for equipment type j, [Ref. 12] 
Ej=number of equipment type j ashore. 
Class V (W) (ground ammunition) requirements are a function of 
ammunition type, weapon type, threat, and the phase of combat [Ref. 8]. Weapon types 
range from large weapon systems (e.g. tanks, AAAVs, howitzers) to smaller systems (e.g. 
60 mm mortars, M-16s, 9MMs). In this analysis a mechanized threat is assumed for area 
of operation 1 and an infantry threat is used for all other areas. The MDL has data for two 
phases of combat, assault and sustained. The phase of combat in this analysis is "assault" 
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for the first five days of the operation and then "sustained" for the remaining days of the 
operation. Daily ammunition requirements are computed from the following equation 
[Ref. 8]: 
A= LQif *¥;*Vi 'Vi 
j 
Where A=total daily ammunition requirement in pounds 
Qij=average rounds/day of type i used by weapon type j, [Ref. 12] 
Yi=weight of ammunition type i in pounds, [Ref. 16]. 
Vj=number of weapon type j ashore 
2. Aviation Combat Element (ACE) 
Data representing tactical aircraft daily consumption of commodities supported by 
the FARP comes from assumptions regarding the scenario. Assumptions for ammunition 
consumption are made using typical ordnance loads for each aircraft per mission type and 
number of mission sorties. Assumptions for fuel consumption use information regarding 
fuel capacity and average operational time per sortie. 
a) Scenario Information 
In this scenario the Harriers are shore based within a nearby host nation. 
Commencing on day two of the operation, each available aircraft departs the base and 
proceeds to the vicinity of area of operation 8 (160 nm trip), where they provide close air 
support (CAS) to the forces fighting at that location. Mter expending ammunition and 
before running out of fuel, each Harrier will then proceed to the FARP located 15 nm 
northwest of area of operation 8. At the FARP, each Harrier receives fuel, ammunition, 
and water required to maintain operations. From the F ARP, each aircraft then proceeds 
another 75 nm north to the vicinity of area of operation 1 where they provide CAS to the 
forces fighting at that location. After expending ammunition near area of operation 1, 
each Harrier then travels another 75 nm back to the FARP, where it again receives fuel, 
ammunition and water. From the FARP, each aircraft proceeds back to area of operation 
8, where they provide CAS for a duration of time prior to traveling back to base. 
The Cobras, unlike the Harriers, are based on the amphibs. Each Cobra 
operates 8 hours a day which is consistent with their operational "crew time" and can 
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either be assigned a mission of CAS or escort. Each aircraft's mission dictates their 
ordnance payload. For this analysis, it is assumed that missions are split evenly between 
available Cobras. A Cobra can remain in the air for approximately two hours before 
requiring fuel [Ref. 14]. This equates to 4 fuelings a day and a total of 3 taking place at 
theFARP. 
b) Class Ill 
Fuel requirements (Class ill) are a function of number of aircraft, aircraft 
types, and number of fuelings required each day at the FARP. This relationship is 
reflected in the following equation: 
F = L ~ * Ri * Ni *Xi 
i 
Where F=total daily FARP fuel required by tactical aircraft in gallons 
Ai=total aircraft in theater of type i 
Ri=fraction of aircraft type i that are operationally ready to fly each 
day, RiE (0,1) 
Ni=total fuelings required at the FARP per aircraft type i per day 
Xi=gallons of fuel provided per fueling of aircraft type i 
Information for Xi given from [Refs. 13 and 14] provides the values of 235 
gal/Cobra fueling and 985 gal!Harrier fueling. The values of Ni come from assumptions 
of the scenario and are 2 for each Harrier and 3 for each Cobra. 
c) Class V (A) 
Class V (A) (aviation ordnance) requirements are a function of number of 
aircraft, aircraft types, the assigned mission of each aircraft, and daily average number of 
times that an aircraft will expend its ordnance payload. Daily ammunition requirements 
are computed using the following equation: 
0 = LLAu * Ri * pij *(Eij -1) 
i j 
Where O=total daily FARP ammunition required by tactical aircraft in lbs 
Aij=total aircraft in theater of type i assigned to mission j 
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Ri= fraction of aircraft type i that are operationally ready to fly each 
day, Ris (0,1) 
Pij=ordnance payload in lbs of aircraft type i assigned to mission j 
&j=daily average number of times an aircraft of type i assigned to 
mission j expends its ordnance payload, &j 2:: 1 
Values for Pij were given from [Refs. 13 and 14]. This equation uses &j 
starting at 1 because the initial ordnance payload of aircraft is provided by the sea-base or 
host nation shore-base. The values for &j come from assumptions made. This analysis 
assumes that an escort mission will have a lower value than a CAS mission and uses the 
following values: EHarrier,CAs= 2.5, Ecobra,CAs= 3.5, and Ecobra,escort= 1.5. 
d) Class I 
Class I (water) requirements are only figured for the Harrier. The Harrier 
requires 36 gallons of purified water per flight [Ref. 13]. Daily water requirements for 
tactical aircraft are computed using the following equation: 
W=A*R*N*X 
Where W=total daily FARP water required by tactical aircraft in gallons 
A=total harriers in theater 
R= fraction of aircraft type i that are operationally ready to fly each 
day, Ris (0,1) 
N=number of times per day that Harrier water must be replenished 
at the F ARP per aircraft 
X=gallons of water provided per Harrier re-supply 
B. MAKE UP OF LOGISTICS VEIDCLES ASHORE 
This analysis observes the effects of deploying logistics vehicles ashore carrying 
commodities in support of area of operation 1 (the most northern area). These vehicles 
will be transported ashore via LCACs on day one of the operation and will travel north 
i 
with a mechanized BLT(-) to area of operation 1. Moving this additional force ashore 
translates into additional LCAC sorties and additional time required to complete the 
deployment of forces. The A TF will always desire to complete the deployment of forces 
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as quickly as possible so as not to slow down the tempo of operations ashore and thus 
there exists a trade off with the deployment of these vehicles. This analysis has defined 
two cases of logistics vehicles deploying ashore. These cases are a light footprint, 
carrying a one day of supply (DOS) in support of forces within area of operation 1, and a 
heavy footprint, carrying two DOS in support of forces within area of operation 1. A DOS 
is determined using the amount of commodities consumed during the assault phase at area 
of operation 1. 
Each logistics vehicle will carry only one type of commodity. Rations will not be 
carried aboard logistics vehicles due to their generally associated low priority amongst the 
four commodities (ammunition, fuel, water, and food) and the small fraction of 
requirements they account for when examining total daily sustainment requirements for 
marines fighting ashore. The number of LCAC sorties required to deploy these vehicles is 
determined by the vehicle weight and the weight of the commodities carried by the 
vehicle. The maximum payload that an LCAC can carry is 120,000 lbs. Therefore, the 
number of LCAC sorties > weight of commodities (lbs)/ 120,000· (Ibs)· Under these assumptions and 
opinions, the following is determined: 
1. Light Footprint 
A light footprint will comprise vehicles carrying one DOS of ammunition, fuel, 
and water for the force located in area of operation 1. This case requires 14 additional 
LCAC sorties to deliver vehicles ashore on day 1 of the operation and is detailed in Table 
6. 
Commodity Type #of LCAC Sorties to Total Commodity 
Transport Moved 
Water 8 21 ,024 gallons 
Fuel 4 20,000 gallons 
Ammunition 2 140,800 pounds 
Table 6. Movement of a Light Footprint of Sustainment 
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2. Heavy Footprint 
A heavy footprint will comprise vehicles carrying two DOS of ammunition, fuel, 
and water for the force located in area of operation 1. This case requires an additional 28 
LCAC sorties to deliver vehicles ashore on day 1 of the operation and is detailed in Table 
7. In this case one LCAC sortie transports both a vehicle carrying water and a vehicle 
carrying ammunition (explanation for non-integer sorties). 
Commodity Type # ofLCAC Sorties to Total Commodity Moved 
Transport 
Water 14.5 40,600 gallons 
Fuel 8 40,000 gallons 
Ammunition 3.5 246,400 pounds 
Table 7. Movement of a Heavy Footprint of Sustainment 
C. TRANSPORTERS 
1. Cargo Profiles 
Data detailing aircraft and landing craft cargo payloads per sortie are developed 
and indexed by commodity type and area of operation. Distances from the sea-base to 
areas of operations, packaging of commodities, and the capabilities of transporters will 
determine this. It is assumed that only one commodity type will be transported per aircraft 
sortie. 
a) Range vs. Payload 
The following table illustrates the range vs. payload relationship for each 
transporter with regards to the effect radius traveled has upon the capability to carry cargo 
based on weight constraints [Refs. 17 and 18]: 
25 






























b) Aircraft External Lift Packaging of Commodities 
Aircraft movement of cargo is not only limited by the cargo's weight but is 
also constrained by the packaging of cargo. Water is transported in 250-gallon bladders. 
A maximum of 6 bladders can be lifted by a single aircraft [Ref. 19]. As a result of this, a 
constraint of 1,500 gallons of water (13,890 lbs which includes the weight of bladders) is 
placed upon the lift capability of one aircraft sortie. 
The packaging of food (MREs) and ammunition is accomplished with nets 
loaded with pallets. Information obtained from [Ref. 15] established that ration weight is 
1.46 lbs!MRE and that one pallet provides 1,110 lbs of MREs or alternately provides 
2,200 lbs of ammo. This analysis uses a maximum of 16 pallets moved in 8 nets (2 pallets 
per net) for food movement [Ref. 20]. Therefore, a constraint of 17,760 lbs of MREs is 
placed upon the lift capability of one aircraft sortie. This analysis does not use a similar 
pallet constraint with ammunition. This is due to an ammo pallet being approximately 
twice as heavy as an MRE pallet. Resulting from this, the aircrafts' maximum payload 
constraint limits an external lift of ammunition before a maximum pallet constraint can. 
The packaging of fuel in this analysis is accomplished with 500-gallon 
bladders. A maximum of 4 bladders can be lifted by a single aircraft [R.ef. 19]. As a 
result of this, a constraint of 2,000 gallons of fuel (14,600 lbs which includes the weight of 
bladders) is placed upon the lift capability of one aircraft sortie. 
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To illustrate the effects both the constraints of packaging and weight have 
upon the MV-22 and CH-53E's capability to deliver commodities, Table 9, based on the 
above constraints and Table 6, is provided. 
Mission MV-22 MV-22 MV-22 MV-22 CH-53 CH-53 CH-53 CH-53 
Radius max lift max lift max lift max lift max lift max lift max lift max lift 
(nm) of of fuel of of of of fuel of of 
water (gal) MREs ammo water (gal) MREs ammo 
(eal) (lbs) (lbs) (eal) (lbs) (lbs) 
35 1,250 1,500 12,118 12,118 1,500 2,000 17,760 22,500 
50 1,000 1,500 11,482 11,482 1,500 2,000 17,760 22,100 
72 1,000 1,000 10,600 10,600 1,500 2,000 17,760 21,450 
100 1,000 1,000 9,362 9,362 1,500 2,000 17,760 20,600 
115 750 1,000 8,726 8,726 1,500 2,000 17,760 20,150 
140 750 1,000 7,620 7,620 1,500 2,000 17,760 19,350 
170 500 500 6,394 6,394 1,500 2,000 17,760 17,800 
Table 9. Maximum Load of Commodity per Aircraft Sortie 
This analysis transforms the sustainment required ashore into the number 
of MV-22 sorties required to deliver sustainment. MV-22 sortie requirements are a 
function of both sustainment per area per commodity and the MV-22 maximum load of 
commodity per area per sortie. Daily requirements for MV-22 sorties are computed using 
the following equation: 
Where Sij =the daily requirement for MV-22 sorties carrying commodity i 
to areaj 
Cij =the daily sustainment requirement of commodity i at area j in 
lbs or gal 
Mij =the MV -22 maximum load of commodity i delivered to area j 
per sortie in lbs or gal 
In this analysis, CH-53s are employed to accomplish as many MV-22 
equivalent sorties as possible. The following table uses information from Table 9 to detail 
how many MV-22 equivalent sorties a CH-53 can accomplish when delivering a certain 
commodity to a certain distance ashore: 
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Mission Radius CH-53 max lift CH-53 max lift CH-53 max lift CH-53 max lift 
(nm) of water of fuel ofMREs of ammo 
35 1.2 1.5 1.466 1.857 
50 1.5 1.5 '1.547 1.925 
72 1.5 2 1.675 2.023 
100 1.5 2 1.9 2.2 
115 2 2 2.14 2.49 
140 2 2 2.33 2.53 
170 3 4 2.78 2.78 
Table 10. CH-53 Sorties Measured in MV-22 Equivalent Sorties 
c) LCAC Movement of Commodities 
When LCACs are used to provide sustainment to the forces ashore, it is 
accomplished by transporting logistics vehicles carrying sizable amounts of commodities. 
The constraint that dictates how many logistics vehicles can be transported ashore per 
LCAC is the LCAC' s maximum payload capacity of 120,000 lbs. 
LCAC movement of water takes place by transporting 2 Logistics Vehicle 
Systems (L VS) carrying 2 water containers each, with each container having the capacity 
to hold 900 gallons (1800 gallons per LVS). In order to stay within the LCAC payload 
weight constraint, each LVS carries 1,400 gallons of water. This equates to 2,800 gallons 
of water delivered per LCAC sortie. 
LCAC movement of fuel takes place by transporting 1 M970 refueler with 
a capacity to hold 5,000 gallons of fuel. This equates to 5,000 gallons of fuel delivered 
per LCAC sortie. 
LCAC movement of MREs and ammunition take place by transporting 2 
L VSs carrying a combination of both commodities. The combination of these 
commodities is classified as "dry cargo". One LVS can carry 16 pallets of MREs (double 
stacked on trailer) for a total of 17,760 lbs of MREs per LVS (1,110 lbs per pallet). One 
LVS can alternatively carry 8 pallets of ammunition (single stacked on trailer) for a total 
of 17,600 lbs of ammo per LVS (2,200 lbs per pallet). This analysis uses the maximum 
ammunition weight per L VS for the constraint of 35,200 lbs of dry cargo per LCAC sortie. 
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2. Sortie Rates 
Sortie rates for each aircraft are a function of the maximum time allowed for 
operation in a day (referred to as "crew day"), the aircraft type, and the distances to the 
areas requiring sustainment. The value for "crew day" used in this analysis is 8 hours, 
which is provided for by fleet standard operating procedures (SOP). 
Average aircraft sortie times are determined for each aircraft type and area of 
operation. This analysis uses a sequence of events to determine these average sortie times 
[Ref. 15]. The following are the events and their respective completion times listed 
in the order that they take place: 
• Attach external lift (3 minutes) 
• Lift and clear sea-base area (2 minutes) 
• Movement to area of operation ashore with an external lift (time varies) 
• Approach landing zone (LZ) located in area of operation (2 minutes) 
• Disengage external lift (3 minutes) 
• Clear LZ area (2 minutes) 
• Movement to sea-base without an external lift (time varies) 
• Approach and land at sea-base (2 minutes) 
• Re-fuel at sea-base (15 minutes) 
Speeds for the MV-22 and CH-53 differ from one another. The MV-22 can 
maintain a speed of 110 knots while transporting an external load and 210 knots while 
transiting back to the sea-base empty [Ref. 18]. The CH-53 can maintain a speed of 100 
knots while transporting an external load and 130 knots while transiting back to the sea-
base empty [Ref. 15]. 
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Average sortie times are figured using the following equation: 
Sij =P+L+(Di *60)/SLi +Z+O+C+(Di *60)/SEi +A+R 
Where Sij=average sortie time in minutes for aircraft type i traveling to area of 
operationj 
P=time to attach external lift in minutes 
L=time to clear the sea-base in minutes 
Dj=distance to area of operation j from the sea-base in nm 
S~=speed of aircraft type i carrying an external load in knots 
Z=time to approach the LZ in minutes 
O=time to disengage the external lift in minutes 
C=time to clear the LZ in minutes 
S~=speed of aircraft type i traveling back to the sea-base without a load in 
knots 
A=time to approach and land on the sea-base in minutes 
R=time to re-fuel on the sea-base in minutes 
By using the previously defined equation to develop sortie times and employing 
the "crew day" constraint, the following tables (one table for each sea-base location) give 












Distance to MV -22 sortie time Max # of sorties CH-53 sortie time 
Sea-base (nm) (min) perMV-22to (min) 
area of operation 
100 112 4 135 
85 100 4 119 
75 91 5 109 
65 83 5 98 
60 79 6 93 
50 71 6 82 
45 66 7 77 
35 58 8 66 
Table 11. Sea-base #1 Aircraft Sortie Infonnation 
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Max # of sorties 










Area of Distance to MV-22sortie Max # of sorties CH-53 sortie Max # of sorties 
Operation Sea-base time(min) perMV·22to time(min) per CH-53to 
(nm) area of operation area of operation 
1 140 145 3 178 2 
2 125 133 3 162 2 
3 115 125 3 151 3 
4 110 120 4 146 3 
5 105 116 4 140 3 
6 95 108 4 130 3 
7 85 100 4 119 4 
8 72 89 5 105 4 
Table 12. Sea-base #2 Aircraft Sortie Information 
Area of Distance to MV-22 sortie Max# of sorties CH-53 sortie Max # of sorties 
Operation Sea-base time(min) perMV·22to time(min) per CH-53to 
(nm) area of operation area of operation 
1 170 170 2 209 2 
2 160 162 2 199 2 
3 150 154 3 188 2 
4 145 150 3 183 2 
5 135 141 3 172 2 
6 125 133 3 162 2 
7 115 125 3 151 3 
8 100 112 4 135 3 
Table 13. Sea-base #3 Aircraft Sortie Information 
This analysis uses lists of executable sorties for each available MV -22 to choose 
from when detennining where each MV-22 travels a certain day. These lists are 
developed for each sea-base location and day of the operation and employ the "crew day" 
constraint and sortie time information previously discussed. For every day, each available 
MV-22 chooses exactly one list of sorties to perform. This ensures that the individual 
aircraft does not violate the daily "crew day" constraint and provides which areas ashore it 
delivers sustainment to. The following table provides an example of some lists of sorties, 
while aircraft are operating from sea-base #3 on day 2: 
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Sortie List # of Sorties to # of Sorties to # of Sorties to 
Number Area al Areaa7 Area aS 
1 2 1 0 
2 2 0 1 
3 1 0 0 
4 1 0 2 
5 1 0 1 
6 1 2 0 
7 1 1 0 
8 1 1 1 
Table 14. Example of Sortie Lists for an MV-22 to Execute in a Day while Operating 
from Sea-base #3 
3. Aircraft Availability 
Both aircraft attrition due to enemy interdiction and maintenance requirements 
cause a decrease in the number of aircraft available with the passage of time. Of the 
available aircraft, a certain number of them are dedicated to operational and other than 
normal sustainment missions (troop movement, MEDEV AC). The remaining non-
dedicated aircraft determine the types and respective quantities of aircraft available for 
sustainment missions. 
a) Enemy Interdiction of Aircraft 
Enemy attrition of aircraft is analyzed at three different levels (high, 
medium, none). Each level has associated with it a percentage of initial in-theater aircraft 
attrited throughout the operation for both aircraft types. Table 14 shows the levels of 
attrition and their respective percentage and total number of aircraft attrited. 
Level of % ofMV-22s Total #of % ofCH-53s Total# of 
Attrition Attrited MV -22s Attrited Attrited CH-53s Attrited 
High 5 2.4 5 1.1 
Medium 3 1.44 3 .66 
None 0 0 0 0 
Table 15. Aircraft Attrition due to Enemy Interdiction Over Entire Campaign 
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After calculating total number of aircraft attrited for both MV-22 and CH-
53E, determining on which day each attrition takes place is required. This is determined 
using the assumption that most aircraft attrition occurs at the beginning of the operation 
and that the enemy's anti-aircraft capability is continuously degraded by friendly forces as 
time increases. Mathematically this is determined with a linearly decreasing function 
representing. percentage of total aircraft shot down occurring on day t (t = 1 ... 14). Figure 
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Figure 4. Percentage of Total Aircraft Shot Down Occurring on Day (t) 
In this analysis, the cumulative number of aircraft attrited by the end of a 
day is calculated using the following equation: 
t 
~~ = Lpn *~ 
n=l 
Where Ait=cumulative number of aircraft of type i attrited by the end of 
dayt 
Pn=percentage of total aircraft attrited on day n 
Ti=total number of aircraft of type i attrited by the end of the 
operation 
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b) Maintenance Readiness 
It is assumed that initial aircraft readiness starts above projected readiness 
levels with cannibalization, priority for best equipment from CONUS and force closure 
time to work on maintenance. This analysis uses initial aircraft readiness rates of .90 for 
the MV-22 and .85 for the CH-53. It is also assumed that the aircrafts' readiness rates will 
decrease linearly to their projected sustained readiness rates. On day 7 of the 14-day 
operation the maintenance readiness of both aircraft are at their projected rates and remain 
at these rates through the end of the operation. This analysis uses projected maintenance 
readiness rates of .75 for the MV-22 and .70 for the CH-53 [Ref. 15]. In determining how 
many aircraft are available for operations on day t, the maintenance readiness rate on day t 
is applied to the number of aircraft available after enemy aircraft interdiction on day t-1 
(for t = 2 ... 14). Calculations resulting in non-integer values of aircraft available are 
rounded down for use in this analysis. 
c) Aircraft in Support of Troop Movement Missions 
In this scenario there is a requirement for the use of aircraft to support 
troop movement missions. The number of these missions is reduced, however, due to 
roughly 75% of the force ashore being classified as mobile. In determining how many 
aircraft to dedicate for troop movement missions, this analysis refers to similar studies 
conducted [Ref. 11]. In the referred study, the requirement was to move 1,000 troops each 
day, with an approximate 12,700 personnel ashore. This computes to a daily requirement 
to move 7.87% of the forces ashore with aircraft. In our scenario, 7.87% of approximately 
4,300 troops ashore equates to a requirement to move 338 troops a day. This analysis 
assumes that there is a requirement to move each 1/3 of the total number of troops 
simultaneously. This translates into each 113 troops of the 338 total requiring to be 
moved at a single time during the day. With the MV-22 as the primary aircraft for troop 
movement and its capability to haul a maximum of 24 troops with one sortie, 5 MV -22s 
are dedicated each day for troop movement in this analysis and are not available for 
sustainment missions. 
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d) Aircraft Dedicated for MEDEVAC 
MEDEV AC missions normally require support from aircraft. This analysis 
uses some of the assumptions developed in [Ref. 15], with regard to dedicating aircraft to 
support medevacs. Part of these assumptions are that the landing force ashore does not 
generate a requirement greater than 49 troops per day to evacuate and that non-critical 
:MEDEV AC will be done on the re-supply aircraft. The MV -22 can carry 12 litters and 
one is stationed ashore with the FARP. Another MV-22 is on standby at the sea-base. As 
the MV -22 ashore lifts off toward the sea-base with casualties, the other flies in to be on 
standby, ashore. The UH-1N, in fact, is used to support MEDEVAC missions in [Ref. 
15]. However, due to the longer ship-to-shore distances and the Osprey's enhanced speed, 
the MV -22 is assigned to support these missions in this study. 
e) Tactical Bulk Fuel Distribution System (TBFDS) 
The final mission that aircraft are dedicated to, outside of the normal 
sustainment missions, is the delivery of fuel to the FARP with the TBFDS. The number 
of aircraft to dedicate to this mission is a function of the fuel required at the FARP, 
amount of fuel delivered per sortie, and the daily maximum number of daily sorties per 
CH-53. Both the computation of the fuel required at the FARP and the TBFDS fuel 
delivered per sortie (2,400 gallons) have been discussed. There is then a requirement to 
determine the daily maximum number of sorties per CH-53E, which is a function of 
average sortie time per day and the "crew day" constraint. Average sorties times are 
determined with the following equation: 
S; = L+(D; *60)1 S +Z +F+C+(D; *60)1 S +A+R 
Where Si=average sortie time in minutes for a CH-53 with TBFDS 
traveling to and from sea-base i 
L=time to lift and clear the sea-base (2 minutes) 
Di=distance to the FARP from sea-base i (nm) 
S=speed of CH-53 carrying the TBFDS (130 knots) 
Z=time to approach the LZ (2 minutes) 
F=time to unload fuel at the F ARP (30 minutes) 
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C=time to clear the LZ in (2 minutes) 
A=time to approach and land on the sea-base (2 minutes) 
R=time to re-fuel on the sea-base (30 minutes) 
By using the previously defined equation to develop sortie times and 
employing the "crew day" constraint, the following table displays sortie times and 
maximum number of sorties per aircraft: 
Sea-base Distance to the CH-53 wtrBFDS Max # of sorties per 
Number FARP from the sortie time (min) CH-53E wtrBFDS per 
sea-base (nm) day=Si 
1 45 110 4 
2 85 146 3 
3 115 174 2 
Table 16. CH-53E with TBFDS Sortie Information 
Using information provided in Table 16, the following equation determines 
the daily total number of CH-53s to dedicate to the mission of delivering fuel to the 
FARP: 
data required. 
Where Ci=total number of CH-53s to dedicate each day to the re-supply of 
fuel to the FARP with aircraft located at sea-base i 
F=total daily fuel required at the FARP in gallons 
T=total fuel moved with one CH-53E wffBFDS sortie in gallons 
Si=maximum number of sorties per CH-53E wtrBFDS per day with 
aircraft located at sea-base i 
This completes discussion of the methodology used and development of the 
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V. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
In this study's evaluation of SBL, the primary objective is to sustain forces ashore 
with deliveries of sustainment from available aircraft. This poses a challenge because 
everyday the number of aircraft available for sustainment missions is limited by aircraft 
maintenance readiness, enemy attrition of aircraft, and aircraft dedicated to other missions 
(e.g. troop movement, MEDEV AC, and TBFDS). When use of available aircraft sorties is 
not enough to deliver all sustainment required, then inventory of commodities held by 
units ashore should be utilized. If both the use of inventory ashore and deliveries of 
sustainment by aircraft are not enough to provide all sustainment required, then LCACs 
will have to be utilized to deliver the shortfall. If LCACs are used for transporting 
sustainment, then it should occur in such a manner that requires the least resources or 
effort needed to secure and/or defend the lines of communication ashore. This will be 
accomplished by minimizing both the number of daily LCAC sorties required and the 
distance from the single LCAC landing site to the area(s) ashore requiring LCAC delivery 
of sustainment. This desire to minimize both the number of daily LCAC sorties and the 
distance from the LCAC landing site to the area(s) ashore requiring sustainment from 
LCACs, motivates this study to use an optimization model. 
The model keeps track of an individual aircraft's sorties, detailing what 
commodity is delivered to which area per sortie. Since aircraft fly integer values of sorties 
and not fractional values, Mixed Integer Programs (MIPs) are used to model this study's 
problem. 
With deployment of forces on day 1 including some sustainment, problem 
modeling will focus on the resupply of forces ashore for days 2 through 14 of the 
operation only. MIPs possessing numerous integer variables, which are difficult to tightly 
bound, have associated with them memory size and run time problems. Resulting from 
this and in an attempt to minimize the number of integer variables, problem modeling is 
achieved through solving two separate MIPs in sequence, for each resupply day. Since it 
can be assumed that the number of CH-53s available for sustainment missions will always 
be much less than that of the MV-22s, the first program's objective is to employ the 
available CH-53s in support of minimizing the number of sorties required by MV -22s to 
37 
deliver sustainment ashore. The second program's objective function is to employ the 
available MV-22s in support of minimizing the number of LCAC sorties required to 
sustain the forces ashore and, in the event that LCAC sorties are required, to support the 
areas with the shortest distance to the LCAC landing site. If the resulting number of 
LCAC sorties is zero, aircraft can deliver all sustainment to forces ashore in the case 
study. The model considers the operation one day at a time and in doing so minimizes 
daily LCAC sorties for days 2-14 of the operation. 
As a result of the model being comprised of two separate programs that are 
executed for each day of the operation and one day at a time, there is a requirement to 
transfer information between both programs and days. The information that requires 
transfer between days is the end of day inventory of commodities on day t, whose value 
will be passed on to represent the beginning of day inventory of commodities on day t+ 1. 
The information that requires transfer between programs is the amount of commodity 
requiring MV-22 delivery, after CH-53 deliveries have taken place. 
A problem that arises from solving the two models one day at a time is the 
possibility of forces ashore consuming inventory of commodity too early in the operation. 
If inventory is consumed on a day where available aircraft can deliver all required 
sustainment, then later in the operation, when there are fewer available aircraft, there will 
be less inventory to help minimize the number of LCAC sorties required. In this example, 
the overall problem modeling did not achieve the optimal objective values for daily LCAC 
sorties. Resulting from this problem, a secondary objective function is used in the MV -22 
program, attempting to maximize the inventory of commodities carried by logistics 
vehicles ashore at the end of the day. This function's purpose is to drive the model to use 
all available aircraft sorties to deliver sustainment prior to using commodities carried by 
any logistics vehicles. This is desired since the number of available sorties on day t will 
be equal to or greater than the number of available sorties on day t+ 1 due to aircraft 
attrition and maintenance readiness. Therefore, the ability to deliver sustainment with 
aircraft becomes increasingly difficult with each day the operation progresses. Resulting 
from this, consumption of inventory (commodities) shouldn't take place till later in the 
operation when most needed. The maximum amount of inventory that will be held in a 
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given day is bounded above by the capacity of the logistics vehicles present. The 
secondary objective function's maximum effect upon the model's overall objective 
function will be very small relative to the primary objective function's effect. 
The major drawback with this study's model is that it uses a myopic vice a multi-
period approach. This approach was chosen after numerous run time and branch and 
bound memory problems encountered by attempting to model the problem with multi-
period MIPs. Resulting from the model's myopic approach is the fact that LCAC sorties 
are not minimized for the entire operation, for case studies where there is inventory 
ashore. A multi-period model would be able to look over the entire duration of the 
operation and observe when the best time would be to consume inventory in support of 
minimizing LCAC sorties. This study's model instead minimizes LCAC sorties one day 
at a time but also attempts to maintain as much inventory as possible at the end of the day, 
in support of the next day's sustainment effort. As a result, this study's model attempts to 
maximize delay of the day when the first L~AC sortie is required. 
A. INDICES 
a areas of operation ashore, (a I. .. a8) 
chc CH-53 and its crew available for sustainment missions, (ex. chcl. .. chc12) 
[To date, Marine aviation operates with equal number of aircraft and 
crews.] 
com a list of sorties for an MV-22 to execute in a day, (ex. com 1 . .. com68) 
k commodity, (kl=water, k2=fuel, k3=rations, k~=ammo) 
mvc MV-22 and its crew available for sustainment 'missions, 
(ex. mvcl ... mvc43) 
p type of aircraft, (MV22, CH53) 
s category of commodity delivered by LCAC, (water, fuel, dry) 
t day, (tl. .. t14) 
B. INDEX SETS 
A1 E: a areas of operation where forces are located on day t 









Artificial penalty value associated with a required MV -22 
equivalent sortie in support of area a that does not get executed by 
CH-53s (unit less) 
Artificial penalty value associated with one LCAC sortie delivering 
sustainment to support area a (unit less) 
The inventory quantity of commodity k located at area of operation 
a at the beginning of day t (lbs or gal) 
The logistics vehicles capacity to hold commodity k in area a (lbs or 
gal) 
Qty of commodity k consumed in area of operation a on day t (lbs 
or gal) 
The quantity of commodity k consumed at area a not supported by 
CH-53 deliveries on day t (lbs or gal) 
The total number of MV -22 sorties required to deliver water, fuel 
and ammunition to area al on day t+ 1 
crewt Max time that a transporter crew can operate per day, "crew time" 
mxldk,p,a 
(min) 
Maximum qty of commodity k that can be lifted by aircraft type p to 
area of operation a with one sortie(lbs or gal) 
mxldlcs Th~ maximum quantity of commodity type s that can be transported 
by one LCAC sortie (lbs or gal) 
mveqsortk,a The number of MV-22 equivalent sorties that a CH-53 sortie can 
provide when delivering commodity k to area a 
mvstrqdk,a.1 The number of MV -22 sorties required to support the consumption 
of commodity k at area a on day t 
mvstrqdlk,a,1 The number of MV-22 sorties required to support the quantity of 
the consumption of commodity k at area a on day t minus the 
commodity inventory 
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mvstrqd2k,a,t The number of MV -22 sorties (integer) required to support the 
consumption of commodity k at area a on day t, after CH-53 
deliveries of sustainment take place 
mvstrqd3a,t The total number of MV -22 sorties (integer) required to support the 
consumption of all commodities at area a on day t, after CH-53 
deliveries of sustainment take place 
numsorta.com The number of sorties to area a that a single MV-22 can execute 
when scheduled to fly the list of sorties com 
stp,a Average sortie time for transporter p to conduct a sustainment 
mission to area of operation a (min) 
D. VARIABLES 
CHchc,k,a,t (Integer) # of sorties flown by CH-53 crew chc carrying only 
commodity k to objective area a on day t 
CHDLRk,a,t (Positive) Amount of commodity k delivered to area a by CH-53s 
on day t (lbs or gal) 
CSHT k,a,t (Positive) Amount of commodity k shortfall in area a on day t(lbs or 
gal) 
Dmvc,com,t (Binary) An indicator that is 1 ifMV-22 crew mvc performs the list 
of sorties com on day t and 0 otherwise 
INV k,a,t (Positive) Amount of commodity k unconsumed in area of operation 
a at the end of day t (lbs or gal) 
LCACs,a,t (Integer) # of sorties flown by LCACs carrying commodity s in 
support of area a on day t 
MVEQVk,a.t (Positive) Number ofMV-22 equivalent sorties carrying commodity 
kto area a executed by CH-53s on day t 
MVDLRk,a,t (Positive) Amount of commodity k delivered to area a by MV-22s 
on day t (lbs or gal) 
MVSHTa,t (Positive) Total number of MV-22 sorties to area a that are not 
accomplished by the end day t 
41 
REMAINk,a,t (Free) Amount of commodity k requiring MV -22 delivery to area a 
on day t after CH-53 deliveries have taken place (lbs or gal); If the 
value is negative then CH-53 deliveries satisfy the total requirement 
and/or an inventory can be held resulting from a surplus of delivery. 
SHTa,k,t (Positive) # of MV -22 sorties to area a carrying commodity k that 
are not executed by the end of day t 
E. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
1. CH-53 Sustainment Model 
Min I I alpha I a* (mvstrqdlk,a,t - MVEQVk,a,t) 
k A1t:a 
Subject to: 
L L CHchc,k,a,t * st .. CH53",a < crewt 
k A1&a 
L CHchc,k,a,t * mveqsortk,a > MVEQ~,a,t 
chc 
MVEQVk,a,t ~ mvstrqdlk,a,t 
L CH chc,k,a,t * mxld k,"CH53",a = CHDLRk,a,t 
chc 
conslkar -CHDLRkat =REMA!Nkat 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
0 < CH < l ere~ J 
- chc,k,a,t - f 
S "CH53",a 
MVEQVk,a,t'CHDLRk,a,t ;;::: 0 
CHchc,k,a.t E Integer 
\:fchc 
\:IA1 e a,k 
\:IAtea,k 
\:IArea,k 
\:fAr € a,k 
\;/ chc, k, a, t 
\:lk,a,t 









The objective function minimizes the number of sorties required by MV -22s to 
deliver sustainment ashore. A penalty value for each area attempts to allow sorties for 
different areas to be additive. The penalty's goal is to penalize "sorties required by 
MV-22s" more ifthey are associated with areas that an MV-22 can fly fewer sorties to per 
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day. The penalty value assigned to area a is a function of the maximum number of daily 
sorties executed by an MV -22. The following equation demonstrates this relationship: 
l crewt J l h Sf"MV'2" "a8" 
ap ala = - . l crewt J 
Sf"MV22",a 
The "crew day" constraint, equation (1 ), ensures that CH-53s do not exceed their 
maximum operational time. The number of MV-22 equivalent sorties executed by CH-
53s carrying commodity k to area a is figured in equation (2). Equation (3) ensures that 
CH-53s do not fly more MV -22 equivalent sorties than required. The amount of 
commodity k delivered to area a by CH-53s is figured in equation (4). The amount of 
commodity k requiring MV -22 delivery to area a after CH-53 deliveries have taken place 
is determined in equation (5). Equation (6) places an upper bound on the integer variable 
of CH-53 sorties. Equations (7) and (8) further define the bounds of the model's 
variables. 
2. MV -22 Sustainment Model 
For days 2 through 13 the objective function follows: 
Min "" alpha2a * LCAC.,,a,t - "(IN~."al/cc'·' ) * (mvstrqdk,"al".t+l I ) 
LJ LJ LJ capk "al" I comwtt+1 
s A,ca Kck • 
For day 14 (the last day of the operation) the objective function is as follows: 
Min L Lalpha2a * LCACs,a,tt4 
s A114ca 
Subject to: 
L Dmvc,com,t = 1 
com 
"'mvc (1) 
I I numsort com,a * D mvc,com,t = mvstrqd3 a,/ - MVSHTa.t v Ar € a (2) 
mvc com 




MV-22 Sustainment Model (Continued) 
MVDLRk,a,r::; (mvstrqd2k,a,r- SHTk,a,r )* mxldk,"MV22 .. ,a VAt € a,k (4) 
INVk.a.r-CSHTk.a,r =beginvk,a,r +MVDLRk.a,r -cons2k,a,r VAtE:a,k (5) 
CSHT..kl",a.r ~ LCAC .. warer",a,r * mxldlc .. warer" VAtca (6) 
CSHT..k2",a,r ~ LCAC..Juer.a,r * mxldlc .. 1ue~" VAt € a (7) 
CSHT.k3",a,r + CSHT..k4",a,r ~ LCAC..dry",a,r * mxldlc .. dry" VAt c a (8) 
Vk,a,t (9) 
0 < LC'AC < rcons2 .. kl" aafm l 
- "water",a,t - ' ' /d/ 
mx c"water" 
Va,t (10) 
o ~LeA c.. .. ~rcons2 .. k2",aafm' l fuel .a,t mxldlc 
"fuel" Va,t (11) 
0 < LC'AC < rcons2 .. k3",a,r + cons2 .. k4",a/mr l 
- "drv".a,t - /d/ 
. mx c .. dry" Va,t (12) 
CSHTk,a,r, MVDLRk,a,t, MVSHTa,t, SHTk,a,t :2:: 0 Vk,a,t (13) 
SHTk,a,t 'LCA c,,a,/ E Integer Vk,a,t,s (14) 
D mvc,com,t E ( 0,1) Vmvc,com,t (15) 
The objective function for day 14 minimizes the number of LCAC sorties required 
to sustain the forces ashore. The weighing of the LCAC sorties based upon the area 
supported is to ensure that the priority of LCAC sorties goes to the most southern areas of 
operation (shorter lines of communication to secure). The objective function for days 2-
13 contains the same objective function as day 14, however, also contains a secondary 
objective function. This secondary objective function attempts to maximize all 
commodity inventory levels at the end of the day in area al. The minimum value that this 
function can obtain is -1. The individual commodities (k = kl, k2, and k4) are weighted in 
this function by the total number of MV -22 sorties required to deliver commodities to area 
al the following day. The weight of commodity k is determined by the total number of 
MV -22 sorties required to deliver commodity k to area a], the following day, divided by 
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the total number of MV -22 sorties to required to deliver all commodities kl, k2, and k4 to 
area a. 
Equation (1) ensures that each MV-22 available for sustainment missions is 
scheduled to execute one list of sorties. The total number of MV -22 sorties to area a that 
are not accomplished by the end of the day is figured in equation (2). The total number of 
MV-22 sorties to area a carrying commodity k that are not executed by the end of the day 
is figured in equation (3). The amount of commodity k delivered to area a by MV -22s is 
determined in equation (4). The inventory constraint is defined in equation (5). 
Inventory left at the end of the day is a function of the previous day's inventory and 
present day's commodity consumption and commodity delivered by aircraft. If 
commodity demand is not met by prior day's inventory and present day's deliveries, then 
·a shortfall variable will assume a positive value. Equations (6), (7), and (8) ensure that 
commodity shortfalls are supported by LCAC sorties delivering sustainment. The 
commodity inventory is bounded above by the capacities of logistics vehicles in equation 
(9). Equations (10), (11), and (12) place an upper bound on the integer variable of the 
number of LCAC sorties. Equations (13), (14), and (15) further define bounds on the 
model's variables. 
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VI. RESULTS 
This study uses three variables (levels of aircraft attrition due to enemy 
interdiction, ship-to-objective distances, and deployment of logistics vehicles carrying 
commodities) to develop 27 different case studies. The levels of aircraft attrition are 
classified as high, medium, and none. The levels of ship-to-objective distances are 
classified as long, medium and short. Finally, the levels oflogistics vehicles deployed are 
classified as a heavy footprint, a light footprint, and no deployment. 
This study then models the number of aircraft and LCAC sorties per day required 
to deliver sustainment ashore for each day of the operation. The model's objective 
function both minimizes the number of LCAC sorties required and, in the event that 
LCAC sorties are required, attempts to use these sorties to deliver sustainment to areas 
that are located the shortest distance from the LCAC landing site (location of landing site 
is in the southern part of the AOR). Important information that the results of the model 
provide include: 
• The total number of LCAC sorties required for the entire operation 
• The day on which LCAC sorties are first required 
• The maximum number of daily LCAC sorties 
• The areas ashore that require support from LCAC sorties 
An increase in the level of aircraft attrition reduces the number of available aircraft 
and makes it increasingly more difficult for aircraft to deliver all required sustainment. 
An increase in the ship-to-objective distances decreases both the total number of aircraft 
daily sorties performed by aircraft and an aircraft's maximum weight lifted per sortie. 
Therefore, increasing ship-to-objective distances makes it increasingly more difficult for 
aircraft to deliver all required sustainment, as well, but also helps protect amphibs from a 
high level enemy threat. An increase in the footprint of logistics vehicles and the 
commodities they carry initially decreases the amount of sustainment required for delivery 
by ship-to-shore transporters but also increases the footprint of the forces ashore, thus 
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increasing the daily consumption of commodities, possibly slowing down momentum, and 
requiring additional resources dedicated to the security of these vehicles. 
This chapter provides model results as well as a discussion of the insight yielded 
by these results. Results should reflect that both an increase in aircraft attrition due to 
enemy interdiction and ship-to-objective distances will increase the total number ofLCAC 
sorties required for the entire operation. An increase in the footprint of logistics vehicles 
should resui.t in both a delay of the day on which LCAC sorties are first required and a 
decrease in the total number ofLCAC sorties required for the entire operation. 
Modeling is implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) 
[Ref. 21] with the CPLEX solver [Ref. 22]. The size of both the CH-53 Sustainment 
Model and the MV-22 Sustainment Model (see pages 42 and 43 respectfully) depend upon 
the number of aircraft or crews available for sustainment missions. With 7 CH-53s 
available for sustainment missions, the CH-53 Sustainment Model has approximately 88 
equations and 289 variables, of which 112 are discrete. With 34 MV -22s available for 
sustainment missions, the MV -22 Sustainment Model has approximately 88 equations and 
2,791 variables, ofwhich 1,368 are discrete. 
The time required to solve each model also depends upon the number of aircraft or 
crews available as well as the relative integer termination tolerance; this is the difference 
between the best integer solution and the best known lower bound, divided by the absolute 
value of the best integer solution. With a relative tolerance of .0001 and having 10 CH-
53s available for sustainment missions, the time to solve the CH-53 Sustainment Model is 
approximately 10 minutes. However, having only 5 CH-53s available and maintaining a 
relative tolerance of .0001, the time to solve the CH-53 Sustainment Model is 
approximately 1 minute. With a relative tolerance of .000001, the time to solve the MV-
22 Sustainment Model is approximately 1 minute. Model runs for this study used a 
personal computer equipped with a Pentium II 333 MHZ processor and 296MB of RAM. 
A. 27 CASE STUDIES 
Tables 17-19 reflect the total number of LCAC sorties required over 14 days to 
sustain forces ashore in all 27 case studies. 
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Level of Aircraft Long Distance, Medium Distance, Short Distance, 
Attrition due to Sea-base #3 to Shore Sea-base #2 to Shore Sea-base #1 to Shore 
Enemy Interdiction Distance (170-100 nm) Distance (140-72 nm) Distance (100-35nm) 
High (5%) 78 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Medium (3%) 71 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
None (0%) 46 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Table 17. No Deployment of Logistics Vehicles 
Level of Aircraft Long Distance, Medium Distance, Short Distance, 
Attrition due to Sea-base #3 to Shore Sea-base #2 to Shore Sea-base #1 to Shore 
Enemy Interdiction Distance (170-100 nm) Distance (140-72 nm) Distance (100-35nm) 
High (5%) 50 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Medium (3%) 43 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
None(O%) 26 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Table 18. Light footprint of Logistics Vehicles supporting the Northern Forces 
Level of Aircraft Long Distance, Medium Distance, Short Distance, 
Attrition due to Sea-base #3 to Shore Sea-base #2 to Shore Sea-base #1 to Shore 
Enemy Interdiction Distance (170-100 nm) Distance (140-72 nm) Distance (100-35nm) 
High (5%) 50 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Medium (3%) 43 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
None(O%) 18 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 0 LCAC sorties 
Table 19. Heavy footprint of Logistics Vehicles supporting the Northern Forces 
With the exception of operating from Sea-base #3, delivery of sustainment to the 
forces ashore can be accomplished without the use ~f LCACs and accounts for aircraft 
unavailable due to their assignment to perform tactical missions (e.g. troop movement and 
MEDEV AC). This result, as will be seen, holds for much higher aircraft attrition rates as 
well. This information should give planners, involved with the subject scenario, 
encouraging insight into the capability of sea-base transport aircraft to support SBL, where 
there is a medium to low enemy threat to the amphibs (i.e. when the sea-base is relatively 
close to the areas of operation ashore). 
Since only the ship-to-objective distances provided by Sea-base #3 imply a 
requirement for LCAC sorties, this case is examined in more detail. In addition to the 
total number of LCAC sorties required for the entire operation, the distribution of these 
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sorties over the days of the operation is examined and the day on which these LCAC 
sorties are first required is of primary interest. 
B. SEA-BASE #3 CASE STUDIES 
Table 20 details the total number of LCAC sustainment sorties required for the 
entire operation when operating from Sea-base #3. In these case studies, LCAC sorties 
are operated to a single beach landing site located in the southern part of the AOR, where 
logistics vehicles carrying the commodities required, drive off the LCAC(s) and travel a 
minimum of 1 0 nm to area of operation 8 or a maximum of 90 nm north to area of 
operation 1. The formulation of the model attempts to deliver all sustainment with only 
aircraft but when this attempt is not feasible, the model then minimizes the number of 
LCAC sorties required to support the northern areas (e.g. area of operation 1 ). 
Information provided in the following tables should help planners, involved with the 
scenario, when the amphibs are subject to a high enemy threat and therefore the sea-base 
must be located far from the areas of operation ashore. 
Level of Aircraft Heavy footprint Light footprint No Deployment of 
Attrition due to (2 DOS ISO area 1) of (1 DOS ISO area 1) of Logistics Vehicles 
Enemy Interdiction Logistics Vehicles Logistics Vehicles 
High (5%) 50 LCAC sorties 50 LCAC sorties 78 LCAC sorties 
Medium (3%) 43 LCAC sorties 43 LCAC sorties 71 LCAC sorties 
None (0%) 18 LCAC sorties 26 LCAC sorties 46 LCAC sorties 
Table 20. Far Ship to Shore Distance (Sea-base #3) 
The decision to deploy logistics vehicles ashore reduces the number of LCAC 
sorties required to deliver sustainment by 20 or more when compared to the decision not 
to deploy logistics vehicles. When comparing a light footprint of logistics vehicles to a 
heavy footprint of logistics vehicles, a heavy footprint does not reduce the total number of 
LCACs sorties required when there is a medium or high level of aircraft attrited. This can 
be explained by the presence of more vehicles and people that require more commodity 
sustainment and therefore more aircraft sorties to support. When there is no attrition of 
aircraft, the decision to deploy a heavy footprint of logistics vehicles ashore reduces the 
number of LCAC sorties required by 8 when compared to the decision to deploy a light 
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footprint. This is different than the case where there is aircraft attrition because both the 
number of aircraft available and commodity carried by these vehicles help push back the 
day on which LCAC sorties are first required to later in the operation. Based on just this 
information planners might decide to deploy a light footprint of logistics vehicles vice a 
heavy footprint. Before making this decision, however, planners need to observe more 
detailed information concerning the case studies involving Sea-base #3. 
Figures 5-7 reflect the total number of LCAC sorties required to deliver 
sustainment per day for each of the 9 case studies involving Sea-base #3. 
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Figure 5. Sea-Base #3, LCAC Sorties Required per Day of the Operation 
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Results in Figure 5 show that when there is no attrition of aircraft, the day on 
which LCAC sorties are first required is day 3, 8, and 9 for the case studies where no 
logistics vehicles are deployed, a light logistics vehicle footprint is deployed and a heavy 
logistics vehicle footprint is deployed, respectively. This is important information, since 
both the security of LCACs and the security of lines of communication ashore could 
possibly improve as the number of days into the operation increases. This information 
provides more support for the argument to deploy logistics vehicles ashore. An additional 
argument for the deployment of logistics vehicles would be that planners should feel more 
comfortable delivering sustainment ashore with 6 LCAC sorties on day 14 than delivering 
sustainment ashore with 6 LCAC sorties on day 5. This example provides the different 
days on which the maximum number of daily LCAC sorties is executed for the case 
studies involving a light footprint of logistics vehicles and no deployment of logistics 
vehicles, respectively. 
Observing Figures 6 and 7 shows that between each level of attrition, there is a 
one-day reduction of the day on which LCAC sorties are first required, for both footprints 
of logistics vehicles. Of the total number ofLCAC sorties required per day (information 
contained in Figures 5-7), a certain number might possibly be required to support northern 
areas of operation ashore. This information is important to know since it would be more 
desirable to have logistics vehicles, coming off LCACs, to not travel a long distance 
ashore. By having logistics vehicles, coming off LCACs, support mostly the southern 
areas, the lines of communication ashore are much shorter. Thus, in this case it is much 
easier to secure the vehicles' movement ashore. 
Figures 8-10 reflect the number ofLCAC sorties per day required to deliver 
sustainment in support of the northern areas ashore (e.g. area of operation 1 and 2). 
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Figure 9. Sea-base #3, LCAC Sorties Required per Day to Support Northern Areas 
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Figure 10. Sea-base #3, LCAC Sorties Required per Day to Support Northern Areas 
Observing Figure 8, it is interesting to note that in the event of no aircraft attrition 
and no deployment of logistics vehicles, there is no requirement for LCACs to support the 
northern areas. This is explained by the increased consumption of commodities when 
deploying additional forces ashore, which translates into an increased number of aircraft 
sorties required. Also interesting to note is the day on which the LCAC sorties are first 
required to support the northern areas is day 12 and day 13 for a light footprint and a 
heavy footprint of logistics vehicles, respectively. 
Figures 9 and 10 show that with aircraft attrition and no logistics vehicles 
deployed, LCAC sorties in support of the northern areas will start on day 4 of the 
operation. This should be of interest to planners because in this scenario, it is very likely 
that the road(s) from the LCAC landing site to the northern areas may not be secured by 
day 4 of the operation. With the deployment of logistics vehicles, however, if there is 
attrition of aircraft, the day on which LCAC sorties are first required to deliver 
sustainment in support of the northern areas wouldn't take place till some day between 
and including days 8-11 ofthe operation. 
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C. EXCURSION 
In an attempt to gain better insight into the model's sensitivity to changes in 
aircraft attrition, an excursion was analyzed using two to three times as much attrition. 
Even by increasing the percentage of aircraft attrited to 15%, delivery of sustainment can 
be accomplished without the use of LCAC when operating from either Sea-base #1 or #2 
locations. Table 21 reflects the total LCAC sorties required for sustainment delivery for 
these case studies with higher levels of aircraft attrition when operating from Sea-base #3. 
Percentage of Total Heavy footprint Light footprint No Deployment of 
Aircraft Attrited (2 DOS ISO area 1) (2 DOS ISO area 1) Logistics Vehicles 
during Operation of Logistics Vehicles of Logistics Vehicles 
15% 93 LCAC sorties 97 LCAC sorties II 0 LCAC sorties 
10% 76 LCAC sorties 79 LCAC sorties I 02 LCAC sorties 
5% 50 LCAC sorties 50 LCAC sorties 78 LCAC sorties 
Table 21. Far Ship to Objective Distance (Sea-base #3) 
With an increase in. the level of aircraft attrition, the difference in the number of 
LCAC sorties required gets increasingly smaller when comparing the decision to deploy 
logistics vehicles or not. This occurs due to the inventory of the logistics vehicles being 
consumed earlier on in the operation, caused by not having enough aircraft to deliver all 
required supplies, and due to the logistics vehicles adding to the daily sustainment 
requirements. Even with increasing the percentage of aircraft attrited, the difference of 
total LCAC sorties required between the two footprints of logistics vehicles is very small 
and as a result a preference might be to decide on deploying a light footprint of logistics 
vehicles vice a heavy footprint. 
Figures 11 and 12 reflect total number ofLCAC sorties required per day with 10% 
and 15% attrition of aircraft. Observing these results shows that increasing aircraft 
attrition results in a decrease in the difference of the day on which LCAC sorties are first 
required when comparing decisions to deploy logistics vehicles to the decision not to 
deploy logistics vehicles. The day on which LCAC sorties are first required, when no 
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logistics vehicles are deployed, is on day 3 (the same day for the case study involving no 
aircraft attrition). When logistics vehicles are deployed, however, this day is between days 
5-7 of the operation (as opposed to days 8-9 for the case studies involving no aircraft 
attrition). Observing these results also shows that by deploying a heavy logistics vehicle 
footprint instead of a light footprint, 1-2 more additional days will be gained before the 
occurrence of the day on which LCAC sorties are first required. This information should 
help planners in situations where a decision needs to be made concerning the amount of 
logistics vehicles to deploy ashore. 
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Figure 11. Sea-base #3, LCAC Sorties Required per Day 
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Figure 12. Sea-base #3, LCAC Sorties Required per Day 
Figures 13 and 14 reflect the number of LCAC sorties per day required to support 
the northern areas with 10% and 15% aircraft attrition. Observing these results shows that 
increasing aircraft attrition also decreases the day on which LCAC sorties are first 
required to support the northern areas, when comparing deploying logistics vehicles to not 
deploying logistics vehicles. The day on which LCAC sorties in support of the northern 
areas are first required is on day 4 and when logistics vehicles are deployed is someday 
between days 7-9 or on day 5. Observing these results also shows that by deploying a 
heavy logistics vehicle footprint vice a light footprint 2-3 more additional days will be 
gained before the occurrence of the day on which LCAC sorties are first required to 
support the northern areas. This information could possibly influence decision makers to 
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Figure 14. Sea-base #3, LCAC Sorties Required per Day to Support the Northern Areas 
After observing all the information presented, planners in this scenario should 
decide how the following desires rank in importance to the success of the operation: 
• Minimize the total number of LCAC sorties required to deliver sustainment 
to the forces ashore. 
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• Minimize the maximum number of daily LCAC sorties delivering 
sustainment to the forces. 
• Maximize the delay of the day on which the first LCAC sortie delivering 
sustainment takes place. 
• Maximize the delay of the day on which the first LCAC sortie delivering 
sustainment to the northern areas takes place. 
This ranking, along with the results previously discussed, will help planners make 
better informed decisions on the deployment of logistics vehicles while operating from 




OMFTS and STOM seek to reduce the footprint of the landing force by sea-basing 
command and control, logistics, and some of the fire support functions. Both a reduction 
in logistical requirements and an increase in unit maneuverability are the results of a 
reduction in the size of the force ashore. To enable the landing force to maintain the best 
mobility and maneuverability possible, delivery of sustainment from the sea-base by 
aircraft is desired. This study provides insight into the ability of aircraft to support the 
delivery of sustainment ashore by observing the effects of varying ship-to-shore distances, 
aircraft attrition, and footprint of logistics vehicles initially deployed. Aircraft 
characteristics modeled included: 
• Availability, factoring maintenance readiness, attrition from enemy 
interdiction, and dedication to other missions; 
• Range vs. commodity payload for each aircraft type; and 
• Operational time required to complete a sortie per distance traveled and 
aircraft type. 
This study's specific results hold only for scenarios with a similar size of deployed 
forces, aircraft availability, and ship-to-objective distances. The scenario analyzed by this 
study was generally composed of a small force ashore (approximately 4,300 personnel 
compared to a traditional MEB landing force of 17,000 personnel), a large number of 
transporter aircraft in theater (it is still not certain what number of CH-53s and MV-22s 
will be able to embark together aboard an LHD/LHA), and moderate ship-to-objective 
distances (distances a lot less than the 250 nm distance that the Chief of Naval Operations 
expressed interest in analyzing [Ref. 23]). 
This study shows that given the forces ashore and the days of the operation, the 
ability to deliver all required sustainment to forces ashore with only aircraft is feasible 
when operating at short to medium ship-to-objective distances, even when attrition of 
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aircraft is relatively high. When ship-to-objective distances are long, though, the delivery 
of all required sustainment ashore with only aircraft is not feasible. However, to minimize 
the total number ofLCAC sorties required during the operation and to delay the day ofthe 
operation when the first LCAC sortie is required, a decision maker could deploy a 
footprint of logistics vehicles ashore carrying sustainment. Depending on the size of the 
footprint, this could start to reduce the landing force' maneuverability but could be viewed 
as preferred to maintaining security of a beachhead and interior lines of communication to 
the forces ashore, which are requirements once LCACs start to deliver sustainment. 
With a larger decrease in aircraft availability due to higher levels of aircraft 
attrition, the benefits of deploying logistics vehicles ashore become increasingly less, 
when observing the difference in the total number of LCAC sorties required and the day 
on which LCAC delivery of sustainment is first required. This results from the need of 
forces ashore to consume the inventory of the logistics vehicles sooner together with the 
logistics vehicles' addition to the sustainment requirements becoming more of a burden 
earlier in the operation. 
Generally, the results show that the factor with the most profound affect upon SBL 
is the ship-to-objective distance. As the distance increases, there is a decrease in both the 
amount of payload carried and number of possible sorties accomplished also occurs. An 
insight gained from observing the effects of these reductions is that ship-to-shore distances 
have more influence over the feasibility of SBL than the other factors examined. 
Looking further into the effect of the ship-to-shore distance upon SBL, it is noted 
that in this study's scenario, an increase in ship-to-objective distances results in fewer 
TBFDS mission sorties perCH-53 and thus requires more CH-53s for dedication to this 
mission. While fewer CH-53s are available for sustainment missions, their utility vis-a-
vis the MV-22 increases. This increase is due to a decrease in the MV-22's capability to 
carry bulk liquids as ship-to-objective distances increase. This is illustrated by observing 
a CH-53 having both the capability to carry 2,000 gallons of fuel and operate at ship-to-
objective distances of 170 run, 140 run, and 35 run, while noting an MV-22 having the 
capability to carry 500 gallons, 1,000 gallons, and 1,500 gallons of fuel when operating at 
the same respective distances (see also Table 10, page 33). Prior studies have identified 
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water and fuel as the SBL drivers [Ref. 8]. Therefore, when comparing the MV-22's 
capability to deliver sustainment to the CH-53, the MY-22's delivery capability decreases 
faster than that of the CH-53 when ship-to-objective distances increase. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
Due to the myopic approach (i.e. solving a series of one day scheduling problems 
instead of a single 14 day scheduling problem) that this study uses to model the problem, 
it is suggested that further effort go into the development and modifications of the model 
in support of a multi-period approach. This would allow the user the flexibility to find an 
optimal solution when the primary objective is either to minimize total number ofLCAC 
sorties required over the operation or to maximize the delay of the first day LCAC sorties 
are required. 
Planners and decision makers should use both this study's model and the 27 case 
studies developed to examine scenarios where both the size and composition of the 
landing force and the number of aircraft in theater at the beginning of the operation differ 
from this study's scenario. Additionally, continuing attempts should be made to gain 
insight into the effects that varying other factors (varying ship-to-objective distances, 
enemy attrition, etc) have upon SBL. More detailed analysis will assist in the ongoing 
concept development process. 
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